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ABSTRACT 
Since the early 1990s, Uganda has been one of Africa￿s fastest growing countries. 
However, at the sub-national level, growth has been uneven due to civil conflict in the 
northern region. Using a panel of household and community level data, this paper 
examines the links between security and economic growth. It is found that security is a 
pre-condition for successful economic development and that there is in fact a threshold 
level of security below which public investments in infrastructure and education have 
little impact on growth. Only when security exceeds this threshold do public investments 
stimulate economic growth. Economists and policy advisors living in peaceful countries 
often prescribe economic policies that hinge on the assumption of good security. In this 
manner, security, like oxygen, is taken for granted. 
JEL Keywords: Security, civil strife, growth, poverty, Uganda, Africa.    7
SECURITY IS LIKE OXYGEN:  








A large body of growth literature and cross-country empirics has highlighted 
some key correlates of economic growth, such as institutions, geography, finance, and 
trade (Temple, 1999). Global cross-country regressions impose a structural linear 
relationship on the available data and often use a dummy variable to control for outliers 
such as Sub-Sahara African countries (Collier and Gunning, 1999).
1 All countries, 
including the outlier countries, are assumed to share the same growth patterns except for 
differences in their intercept coefficients. As a result, the key explanatory variables have 
the same ubiquitous impact on growth across different development stages and across 
space, and policy sequencing does not matter. However, because of the diverse nature of 
countries, the relationships uncovered in the cross-country empirics may not always have 
the same importance. For example, in a country engaged in civil war, the public may 
more urgently demand the restoration of public order (and basic infrastructure, as in Iraq 
and Afghanistan) than market liberalization. Simply relying on the results generated from 
cross-country empirics and ignoring the order of importance of different policies at the 
individual country level may lead to improper policy advice, as was often the case with 
the macro adjustment programs in the 1980s.   
Recognizing that general growth theories and development principles are not 
adequate for guiding developing countries, especially in those sub-Sahara African 
countries plagued by conflict, Collier and his coauthors (Collier, 1994; Collier, 1999; 
                                                 
∗ Xiaobo Zhang is a research fellow in the Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD) of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
1 Among the exceptions are the work by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) who identify multiple regimes and the 
parameters vary significantly across the regimes.    8
Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo, 2001) have made seminal 
contributions in examining the nature and consequence of civil conflict, bringing research 
on civil strife into the agenda of development economists. Collier (1999) characterizes 
the four major effects of civil conflict on an economy --- destruction of physical capital, 
disruption of economic exchange, diversion of public expenditure from output-enhancing 
activities, and dissaving (capital flight). One implication of the study is that conflict-
vulnerable countries have different features than peaceful countries and therefore more 
in-depth case studies of these countries are needed. However, due to lack of detailed 
within-country data, these studies still rely heavily on cross-country regressions and use a 
dummy variable to control for war or conflict. This implicitly assumes a linear 
relationship between key explanatory variables and growth regardless of the degree of 
insecurity.  
Yet, a country￿s needs, like a human being￿s, do have an order of importance. As 
survival and security are of the utmost need for a human being, so too are they for a 
country. In this paper, we use Uganda as a case to demonstrate that security is a pre-
condition for development. Only when security reaches a certain threshold, does 
improvement in infrastructure start to have an impact on growth. On the other hand, 
poverty and lack of economic development could be a root cause of disorder and 
conflicts. Without a panel data set, it is difficult to disentangle the two-way causal 
effects.  
Uganda is particularly well suited for our analysis for several reasons. First, 
Uganda has experienced a prolonged civil conflict with the rebels of the Lord￿s 
Resistance Army (LRA), which has attacked civilians and abducted children for nearly 
two decades in the northern part of the country. Second, disagreement between donors 
and the government over spending priorities is pronounced. Although the government 
gives high priority to eliminating the LRA, the government is constrained by lack of 
funds. President Yoweri Museveni has openly blamed the donors￿ restrictions on defense 
spending (Economist, 2004) for the continued violence. Third, high quality survey data 
has been collected at the household and community level over a rather long period,   9
making it possible to control for institutional and cultural differences inherent in cross-
country growth studies. Moreover, the household panel data set enables us to control for 
the possible endogeneity problem of civil strife.  
Deininger (2003) has analyzed the causes and consequences of civil strife in 
Uganda. Similar to the cross-country empirics, he uses standard regressions to examine 
the correlates of civil strife based on official 1992 and 1999 survey data at the household 
and community levels. He finds that government provision of infrastructure has a clear 
conflict-reducing impact (page 580): 
￿￿ lack of economic development is a key factor that increases the incidence of 
civil strife￿. Government policies to raise the opportunity cost of labor, e.g. by 
improving education and infrastructure, would have a clear negative impact on the 
propensity toward civil strife￿￿ 
Table 1:  Public Investment by Region in Uganda in 1997/1998, million shillings. 





Healthcare Feeder  road 
maintenance 
Central  26695 3772 2843  1210 
Eastern  34138 3684 4361  1246 
Northern 29002 2893 4088  1129 
Western  30729 3792 3512  1405 
Source: Fan, Zhang, and Rao (2004). 
Following the demise of the era of repressive governments under Idi Amin and 
Milton Obote in the mid 1980s, Uganda has undergone a dramatic transformation that has 
seen it become one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. This growth has been 
driven in large part by rapid growth of government spending and donor support for 
education and infrastructure (Fan, Zhang and Rao, 2004). As shown in Table 1, the public 
investment in the four regions is rather even and there is no obvious discrimination 
against the northern region. However, as indicated in Table 1 of Deininger (2003) and 
Table 2 of this paper, the incidence of civil strife has risen rather than declined. At least   10
from these tables, the correlation between infrastructure development and civil strife is 
not strong.   
In order to disentangle the puzzle, we look for the threshold effects of civil strife 
on economic growth by running two separate regressions for two types of regions, those 
without security problems and those subject to civil strife. The results show that the on-
going local insurgency has disrupted long-term social and economic activities, 
diminishing the impact of infrastructure improvement and thwarting economic growth. 
Only when security exceeds a certain threshold, does infrastructure development become 
a key engine for economic growth.  
The paper is arranged as follows. The next section describes the data used in 
analysis. The third section presents the model specification and estimation. The final 
section presents some concluding remarks.  
Data 
The data used in this analysis are taken from the 1992 Uganda Integrated 
Household Survey (UIHS) and the 1999 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). 
Both surveys included a household survey, a crop survey (agricultural enterprise survey 
in 1992-93) and a community survey. The household surveys include about 10,000 
households. There are over 1,000 panel households, which have been surveyed in both 
years. The household surveys contain detailed information on expenditures and 
individual characteristics. The 1999/2000 household socio-economic surveys asked   
households to report on the incidence of civil strife, theft, and interpersonal violence in 
1992 and during the year prior to interview.
2 Because the rich are more likely to be 
                                                 
2 The three questions in section 11 of the 1999 UNHS are as follows: (1) ￿Has your production of crops/ 
cattle or livestock rearing/ trading activities been harmed by civil strife over the past 12 months? (2) ￿How 
many incidents of theft of property has the household suffered in the last 12 months and in 1992?￿ (3) 
￿How many incidents of physical attack on members of the household have there been over the last 12 
months and in 1992?￿ Deininger defines a community as affected by civil strife, theft, or attacks, if it is 
reported by at least one household. However, in so doing, the number of communities affected by civil 
strife exceeds 50%. As indicated in Table 1 of his paper, the incidence of civil strife in the western region 
in 1999 was higher at 69.7% than in the northern region (54.1%). This contradicts the fact that the northern 
region is widely perceived to be far more insecure than other regions. In this paper, we calculate the 
average incidence of civil strife at the community level based on the household surveys in 1992 and 1999   11
targeted for theft and other violence, using reported crime incidents at the household level 
might confound the measure of a broader security environment. We therefore use an 
aggregate measure calculated at the community level as described in footnote 2. The 
community surveys report infrastructure data in 1992 and 1999 including distance to 
roads, markets, clinics, and phone call boxes and the proportion of farmers visited by 
extension agents. 
Table 2:  Civil strife, Per Capita Consumption, and Household Asset by Region in 
1992 and 1999. 









1992        1992 shillings  1999 thousand shillings 
Central 2.2  14.1  3.0 25,256  5,764 
East 8.5  13.4  5.8  15,205  2,161   
North 12.9  19.6  5.5  12,566  1,230 
West 5.1  14.1  4.4  15,778  3,386 
Total 6.4  14.9  4.5  17,963  3,465   
1999       1999  shillings 
(nominal growth rate) 
1999 thousand shillings 
(nominal growth rate) 
Central  4.9  24.3  4.7  39,441 (56.2%)  6,932 (20.3%) 
East  11.5  26.6  8.5  22,770 (49.8%)  2,431 (12.5%) 
North  12.9  25.1  9.5  16,764 (33.4%)  1,254 (2.0%) 
West  12.6  19.4  5.4  28,477 (80.5%)  3,930 (16.1%) 
Total  9.9  23.9  6.7  28,504 (58.7%)  4,050 (16.9%) 
Note: The information on civil strife, theft, and attack are aggregated from the 1999 Uganda National 
Household Surveys (UNHS). Per capita consumption data for 1992 and 1999 are generated from the 
1992 Uganda Integrated Household Survey and the 1999 UNHS.  The asset data in 1992 is based on 
recall in the 1999 survey. The asset data at both 1992 and 1999 are from the 1999 UNHS. 
Respondents are asked to compare the 1992 asset level with that of 1999 in six categories --- about 
equal, somewhat more, somewhat less, none, much more, and much less. Following Deininger 
(2003), we assign the percentage increases corresponding to the above six categories as 0, 25%, -
25%, -100%, 50%, and ￿50%, respectively, to calculate the 1992 asset.  
Table 2 reports civil strife, per capita consumption and household assets by region 
in 1992 and 1999. Several features are apparent from the table. First, the incidence of 
civil strife, theft, and physical attacks increased between 1992 and 1999 for most regions 
and for Uganda as a whole. Rapid economic development has not necessarily translated 
                                                                                                                                                 
and weighted by sample multipliers (not just the panel component) and use the resulting measure as a proxy 
for civil strife.    12
into less civil strife. Second, the regional growth patterns of per capita consumption and 
household assets are related to the level of civil strife. The northern region has the lowest 
growth rate in per capita consumption and household assets and the highest incidence of 
civil strife, theft and attack. In contrast, the central region has experienced the fastest 
growth in expenditure and asset while enjoying the lowest incidence of civil strife and 
crimes. The security environment does appear to be relevant for economic growth and 
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Figure 1.  Civil Strife and Per Capita Consumption Growth at District Level 
Figure 1 plots the degree of civil strife and the growth of per capita consumption 
from 1992 to 1999 at the district level aggregated from the household surveys. The 
horizontal axis represents the incidence of civil strife, while the vertical axis measures 
growth rate of per capita consumption. The figure includes all the districts, clearly 
indicating a negative relationship between the two variables. However, if we look only at   13
districts with civil strife incidence below a certain level, say 0.1, the correlation becomes 
much weaker. Figure 2 shows the level of per capita consumption at the district level 
instead of its growth rate on the vertical axis. Apparently, the level of consumption is 
negatively related to the degree of civil strife. The figure also reveals a possible threshold 
effect of security; only countries with a level of security of below 0.1 appear to achieve 
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Figure 2.  Civil Strife and Consumption in 1999 at the District Level 
Figure 3 presents the correlation of civil strife with market participation for rural 
residents. The market participation variable is defined as the share of agricultural 
products sold to the market, which is aggregated from the crop surveys in 1992 and 1999. 
Figure 4 further graphs the relationship between the incidence of civil strife and changes 
in asset accumulation from 1992 to 1999. The vertical axis shows the average change in 
asset accumulation for a given incidence of civil strife at the community level. The data is   14
aggregated from the entire 1999 household survey. Both figures highlight the negative 
association between civil strife and asset accumulation and participation in market 
exchange, which are two key factors for economic growth. In general, the findings 
support the argument articulated in Collier (1999) and the empirical evidence on Uganda 
in particular (Deininger, 2003). The figures also review a possible threshold effect of 
civil strife on market development, asset assumption, and consumption growth, which 
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Figure 4.  Civil Strife and Change in Asset Accumulation   16
II. CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK 
Following Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) on growth convergence and Dercon 
(2003) on shocks, we model the growth rate of per capita consumption as a function of its 
initial value and a set of other variables: 
i t
it
it D Z y a y
y ε β + + + + = −
−
δ γ ) log( ) log( 1
1
   (1) 
where yit is per capita consumption in 1999 and yit-1 is per capita consumption in 1992. 
The subscripts t and t-1 refer to 1999 and 1992, respectively. The left-hand side variable 
represents the growth rate of per capita consumption in the period. The coefficient β 
stands for the speed of income convergence. A positive value for this coefficient indicates 
convergence while a negative value implies divergence. It provides useful information to 
understand how initial conditions contribute to long-term income growth and whether 
there is a convergence or not. Z is a vector of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks and γ is a 
vector of corresponding coefficients. D is a set of regional dummies and δ is a vector of 
coefficients for these fixed effects. The four regions are central, east, north, and west. We 
also add a dummy variable for rural resident status in the equation to control for the large 
rural-urban difference.  
The Z vector includes idiosyncratic shocks at the household level and covariate 
shocks at the community level. Household shocks comprise: whether the household head 
was sick during the one-month period before the 1999 survey, and having an orphan in 
the household. Because of the AIDS epidemic and the prevalence of tropical diseases, 
such as malaria, the mortality rate is rather high in our sample. About 40% of households 
include an orphan child. Therefore, these two variables to a large extent capture the 
degree of shocks related to health.  
The aggregate shocks include civil strife, change in distance to the most common 
output market, change in distance to the nearest clinic, change in distance to the nearest 
feeder road, change in distance to the nearest phone call box, and change in the   17
proportion of farmers visited by extension agents. We use these variables to capture the 
impact of civil strife and infrastructure development.  
To identify the threshold of civil strife on growth, we first run separate 
regressions using each incidence of civil strife at the community level as a sample 
separator. Based on these regressions on the partial sample and the regression on the 
whole panel, we can calculate the F-test statistic for structural break at each incidence of 
civil strife. Figure 5 reports the log likelihood along different value of civil strife. The 
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Figure 5.  Test for Threshold Levels of Civil Strife 
Table 3 presents the estimation results based on two different thresholds of civil 
strife. The first regression in the table is for the entire sample of panel households. The 
adjusted R-squared is 0.436, relatively high for a cross-sectional regression. It indicates a 
strong convergence in per capita consumption growth. However, some idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks may affect the convergence effect. The coefficient for the civil strife 
variable is statistically significant and high at ￿0.683, in consistent with the findings by 
Deininger (2003). In addition, the coefficient for having an orphan is significantly   18
negative. As shown in the third and last regressions, the basic results still hold if we only 
look at the sample of no serious civil strife.   
Table 3.  The Impact of Infrastructure and Civil Strife on Per capita Consumption 
Growth. 
   Threshold1    Threshold2 








Initial value  -0.875  -0.887 -0.836 -1.011 -0.855 
  (0.032)*** (0.057)***  (0.038)*** (0.107)*** (0.033)*** 
Rural resident  -0.194  -0.298 -0.163 -0.361 -0.152 
  (0.062)*** (0.114)***  (0.074)** (0.219)  (0.064)** 
Sickness  -0.047  -0.001 -0.075 -0.065 -0.054 
  (0.031) (0.055)  (0.037)**  (0.096)  (0.033)* 
Having an orphan  -0.059  -0.053 -0.061 -0.059 -0.059 
  (0.021)*** (0.033)  (0.028)** (0.059)  (0.023)*** 
Change in distance to 
market 
-0.000 -0.003  0.000  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Change in distance to 
clinic 
-0.006  -0.001 -0.012 0.010  -0.008 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)  (0.003)***  (0.008)  (0.002)*** 
Change in distance to 
feeder road 
-0.003  -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 
  (0.001)**  (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Change in distance to 
phone booth 
-0.001 0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Change in extension visit  0.000 0.000  -0.000  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Civil strife  -0.683  -0.651 -1.298 -0.795 -0.867 
  (0.168)*** (0.271)** (1.073)  (0.597)  (0.436)** 
Observations  1052 436 616 172 880 
Adjusted R-squared  0.436  0.421 0.465 0.389 0.456 
p-value of F test: 
Infrastructure no impact 
0.018  0.532 0.003 0.574 0.001 
Chow Test p-value   0.0001  0.0002 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbol * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%, respectively. The regional dummies are note reported here.  
Among the five infrastructure variables, the coefficients for distances to clinic and 
feeder roads are negatively significant. The F-test shows that as a whole, the five 
variables are jointly significant in explaining income growth.    19
However, when repeating the regression using only the communities with serious 
civil strife problem, none of the infrastructure and personal shock variables remains 
statistically significant. The Chow-test further validates that there exists a significant 
structural difference between the two samples and therefore pooling them together may 
overstate the impact of infrastructure development in civil strife-vulnerable regions. 
When a region suffers from civil strife, simply investing precious public resources on 
education and infrastructure may be a waste. Restoring social order and creating a secure 
environment are prerequisites for making further public investments productive. 
In addition to per capita consumption, we also examine the impact of civil strife 
and infrastructure development on poverty dynamics by replacing the left-hand variable 
with a discrete 0,1 poverty dynamics variable. With respect to poverty estimation, we 
closely followed Appleton￿s method (2001) of estimating values of consumption per 
adult equivalent. Based on regionally specific poverty lines described in Appleton (2001), 
we define the poverty status for each household as follows.
3 If a household was poor in 
1992 but not in 1999, we classify it into the category of ￿escaping from poverty￿ and 
assign a value of 1. The remaining households are assigned 0. Similarly, we can define 
those households that were non-poor in 1992 but poor in 1999 as ￿falling into poverty￿ 
and create another pair of binary variables.  
Table 4 shows the logit estimate on the impact of infrastructure development and 
civil strife on poverty dynamics from 1992 to 1999. The outcome variable in regressions 
(1)￿(3) is ￿escaping from poverty￿ while the outcome variable in remaining regressions is 
￿falling into poverty￿. Similar to the findings in Table 3, for the whole sample and the 
partial sample without serious civil strife, the infrastructure variables are jointly 
significant in explaining poverty dynamics. However, in regions plagued with civil strife, 
infrastructure development does not matter much to the outcome. Once again, the Chow-
test shows a structural break when civil strife reaches a threshold.  
 
                                                 
3Appleton (2001) has reported poverty rates at the regional level only.    20
Table 4.  The Impact of Infrastructure and Civil Strife on Poverty Dynamics. 
  Escape from poverty  Fall into poverty 













Initial value  -2.969  -3.075  -2.588  1.874 1.650 3.773 
  (0.201)*** (0.225)*** (0.499)***  (0.208)*** (0.221)*** (0.789)*** 
Rural resident  -1.180  -1.245  -0.965  2.178 1.825 n.a. 
  (0.277)***  (0.304)***  (0.808)  (0.488)*** (0.496)***  
Sickness  -0.190  -0.300  0.054  -0.032 -0.042 0.218 
  (0.139)  (0.160)*  (0.345) (0.180) (0.199) (0.505) 
Having an orphan  -0.060  -0.083  0.025 0.173 0.244 -0.349 
  (0.095) (0.107) (0.214)  (0.105)* (0.110)**  (0.353) 
Change in distance 
to market 
0.007  0.007  0.004 0.012 0.012 0.012 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)  (0.006)**  (0.006)* (0.019) 
Change in distance 
to clinic 
-0.008  -0.019  0.040 0.021 0.028 -0.016 
  (0.011) (0.011)*  (0.030)  (0.012)* (0.014)**  (0.037) 
Change in distance 
to feeder road 
-0.008  -0.008  -0.009  0.006 0.007 0.013 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.028) 
Change in distance 
to phone booth 
-0.001  -0.003  -0.002  0.002 0.004 -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) 
Change in 
extension visit 
0.008  0.010  0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.003)** (0.004)***  (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
Civil strife  -1.430  -2.320  -1.759  2.823 5.617 3.491 
  (0.729)** (2.018)  (2.162)  (0.824)*** (2.479)**  (2.787) 
Observations  1052  880  172 1052  880 172 
p-value of F test: 
Infrastructure has 
no impact 
0.024  0.009  0.699 0.116 0.096 0.975 
p-value of Chow 
Test 
0.437     0.052    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbol * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%, respectively. The regional dummies are note reported here. In areas subject to civil 
strife, those falling into poverty are all in the rural area. Therefore, the dummy for ￿rural resident￿ is 
dropped in regression (6).  
This explains why Uganda has routinely spent more on defense than on other 
public sectors such as education, health, social security, and infrastructure. In part due to 
donor pressures, the share of Uganda￿s defense spending in total government 
expenditures has declined from 42 percent in 1988 to 19 percent in 1997 (Fan, Zhang,   21
and Rao, 2004). However, this level of defense spending is still relatively high when 
compared with other countries in Africa (11 percent), Asia (11 percent), or Latin America 
(6 percent). This share is almost twice the sum of Uganda￿s spending on agriculture, 
health, and infrastructure. But one should be aware that not many countries have such 
serious civil strife problems as Uganda. A continued cut in defense spending may further 
undermine security and make other types of public investment nonproductive. Certainly, 
the government should also actively seek other avenues such as dialogue and democracy 
in the war-torn region to solve the security problem.   22
III. CONCLUSIONS 
Using household and community survey data in Uganda, the paper shows that 
there does exist a threshold effect of security on growth. Without minimal security, it is 
hard for economic exchange to take place and for agents to utilize existing or newly 
provided public infrastructure for productive activities. Only when security reaches to a 
certain level does infrastructure development start to prompt growth. In other words, the 
sequencing of certain public policies does matter. Since lack of public services is one of 
the key constraints facing Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999), it is crucial to study the 
pre-conditions for making public investment successful.  
The results also highlight that development trajectories may not be linear and 
￿one-size-fits-all￿ strategies do not work (Adelman and Morris, 1971; Easterly, 2002; 
Rodrik 2003). In the past, African countries have too often been treated as homogenous 
entities and the development process itself as a process that occurs along a linear 
continuum. Fafchamps, Teal, and Toye (2001) have advocated more research on 
identifying the pre-conditions for initiating growth in Africa. This paper has 
demonstrated security is one of these pre-conditions.  
An implication of these findings is that countries ought to be granted some 
freedom for setting their own spending priorities. Economists sitting in the safe 
developed world may fail to appreciate the minimal requirement of security for economic 
development. They may tend to prescribe policies which often hinge on the assumption 
of good security. In this manner, security, like oxygen, is taken for granted. The 
economic means of investing in education and infrastructure may not be sufficient for 
reducing civil strife. As maintaining the rule of law is a pre-requisite for public 
investment and economic development, without enough attention and good solutions to 
civil strife, it would be difficult for many African countries to achieve the millennium 
development goals (Stuart, 2003).    23
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